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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The court has jurisdiction conveyed by a letter from the Supreme Court of Utah, dated
February 13, 1998, assigning the appeal of this case to the Court of Appeals (R. at 622).

4
5
6
7

STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES
The issues addressed in this reply brief focus on the issues raised in the Appellee Brief of
Third-Party Defendant, 9/1/98. The four substantive issues are:
1.

8

Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant breached the lease agreement
without justifiable cause?

9

2.

Did the trial court have proper grounds for dismissal of Third-Party Complaint?

10

3.

Did the trial court properly act in dismissing Defendant's request for sanctions?

11

4.

Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant was required to provide a

12

second Utah Fit Premises Act notice in an action for breach of contract and

13

constructive eviction?

14
15

Each of these issues will be addressed using page and paragraph references to the
Appellee Brief filed by Third-Party Defendant for ease of correlation.

16
17

18

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUROTY

19

PROVISIONS

20

Third-Party Defendant's Appellee brief contains a statement in this section that "there are

1

Statutory issues in dealing with the application of the Utah Fit Premises Act." This statement

2

would suggest an argument would be presented in the body of the brief. No argument was

3

found. However, the application of the UFPA notice requirements to cases involving landlord

4

breach of contract, constructive eviction, and breach of the implied warranty of habitability is

5

subject to the degree to which the UFPA being sought as a right of action by either party.

6

Additionally, the intent of the UFPA (which evolved from the Owner-Renter Relations

7

Amendment in 1990) is to provide an avenue of leverage and relief to tenants who are

8

subjected to uninhabitable rental conditions, and who chose to remain in the premises or are

9

without the resources needed to vacate the premises, as is required in matters of constructive

10

eviction. This leverage is intended to allow tenants to secure required repairs and remain in the

11

premises, using the threat of legal action against the landlord. The leverage of the tenant is

12

equaled for the landlord by his/her not being liable for defects caused by the tenants.

13

In the instant action, none of the parties are seeking any right of action via the UFPA.

14

The UFPA was cited by Defendant/Appellant as one of the many joint failures of Plaintiff and

15

Third-Party Defendant. The joint failures of Third-Party Defendant and Plaintiff to comply

16

with the provisions of the UFPA, which requires compliance with local ordinance (Ogden

17

City), which in-turn requires compliance with applicable building codes, were cited in the

18

counterclaim and Third-Party claim. The result of the collective failures of Plaintiff and Third-

19

Party Defendant is an unsafe property with numerous construction code violations, which was

20

offered for rent on the public market, and thereby misrepresented by Third-Party Defendant (a

21

professional property manager in Ogden) as compliant with the provisions of the UFPA, local

22

ordinances, and all applicable building and safety codes. This collection of failures was not

23

cited as a claim for relief through the provisions of the UFPA, but rather to indicate just some
2

1

of the many requirements that were ignored by Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant. Since

2

Defendant claimed no relief via the UFPA, notice requirements of the UFPA are not applicable

3

to this action for:

4

a.

breach of contract for failure to perform and deliver,

5

b.

constructive eviction, and

6

c.

breach of the implied warranty of habitability, in addition to

7

d.

fraud for intentional misrepresentation of compliance with applicable statute,

8

ordinance, and building codes:

9

•

when Plaintiff and Third-Party conspired to repair known defects with

10

rental income, thereby requiring that Tenants endure unsafe and non-code

11

compliant conditions while Plaintiff and Third-Party benefited financially

12
13

from

the conspiracy, and
•

14
15
16

by misrepresenting that known defects would be immediately cured and
Plaintiffs personal effects would be immediately removed.

•

by misrepresenting that the premises were statute, ordinance, and building
code compliant at the time the lease was signed by Defendant.

17

18

STATEMENT OF FACTS

19
20

The first three lines of Third-Party Defendant's fact number four are in error. The correct

21

facts are that Defendant walked-through the premises with Third-Party Defendant prior to

22

forming the contingent oral agreements and signing the lease agreement on June 30, 1995.

3

1

Defendant (Trial Transcript pages 227-228). And Third-Party Defendant/Appellee simply

2

fabricated the second sentence as Defendant never stated that the premises were tenantable, at

3

any time. To correct the record, that Defendant did not declare the premises to be tenantable,

4

the entirety of page 227 of the trial transcript is included herein as follows:

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

[Defendant - Witness, continued from previous page] place and,
and visited the property. I was in a property in Salt Lake City. The owner
had decided to move back into the State of Utah and wanted the property
back. The term of my lease was up and I needed to find a place. We
looked for some time to find property and were not terribly successful. A
couple of what we thought were good agreements fell through with good
houses. We discussed those with Mr. Wheeler when we came to visit the
house and therefore some sense of urgency. My time was running out. I
needed to get into a place.
We found the house based on an ad in the paper, called Mr. Wheeler,
set up an appointment, went up and looked at it.
We walked through the house. First observation of the house, it's a
substantial house, there's no argument about that. The pictures reflect
that. And the substantialness of the house tends to make one think in
terms of what a wonderful house and you gloss through it looking at wood
floors, wood walls, look at all the logs, look at the big rocks in the
fireplaces, look at all the beams. And your, Mr. Wheeler's statement that
the, the house was found to be attractive in looking [continued on next
page]
Third-Party Defendant's fact number five omitted the qualifying critical information that

26

the city inspector had never visited the premises or reviewed construction plans of the

27

premises. Additionally, the correct statement by this witness was "My first impression is

28

probably tenantable but it needs some maintenance." (Trial Transcript page 74) And this

29

witness had a professional vested interest in the property being declared habitable, for his

30

office had issued a residential rental license for the property after receiving Defendant's

31

10/18/95 letter, (Exhibit 81-D). This "interest" would only serve to bias the witness regarding

32

the stated condition of the premises.

33

Third-Party Defendant's fact number six omitted critical information that Mr. Froerer's

4

1

opinion of the habitability of the premises was contingent on required repairs being completed

2

as follows:

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

[Fink] Back to the question Counsel asked on whether or not you thought
the house was habitable.
[Froerer] Uh-huh (affirmative).
With or without repair?
No. We wanted repairs done.

And this witness also had a professional vested interest in having the premises declared
habitable, for his agency had listed the premises for lease after Defendant terminated the lease

10

and vacated the premises. This "interest" would only serve to bias the witness regarding the

11

stated condition of the premises, and even then, this witness effectively stated that the premises

12

were not habitable during Defendant's tenancy.

13

Third-Party Defendant's fact number nine omitted critical information regarding the fact

14

presented; that being Defendant's response to Plaintiffs examination that the employment

15

move "provided an opportunity to reduce costs" (Trial Transcript page 246).

16

Third-Party Defendant's fact number 12 presumes that the Defendant brought this action

17

according to the provisions of the UFPA. As stated earlier in this brief, Defendant simply cited

18

the collective failures of the Third-Party Defendant and Plaintiff, one of which was failure to

19

comply with the provisions of the UFPA, specifically, that all rentals must be building code

20

and ordinance compliant, and safe properties.

21

22
23
24

ARGUMENTS
What Third-Party Defendant Did Not Argue or Deny
Conspicuously, throughout the entirety of his Appellee brief, Third-Party Defendant:

5

Did not deny his oral agreement with Defendant to remove Plaintiffs
personal property from the premises within two weeks. (Defendant's Brief
in Chief, page 10)
Did not deny that Plaintiffs property was not removed during Defendant's
tenancy. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 15)
Did not deny his oral agreement with Defendant to repair defects in the
premises as soon as possible. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 10)
Did not deny that the defects identified by Defendant, most notably, the
electrical system defects, were not repaired during Defendant's tenancy.
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 15)
Did not deny that Plaintiff agreed to termination of Defendant's lease.
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 17)
Did not deny that the premises were not compliant with the UFPA, the
Ogden City Ordinance requiring residential rental licenses. (Defendant's
Brief in Chief, page 16)
Did not deny that he accepted Defendant's surrender of the premises.
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 17)
Did not deny mailing his security deposit notice to Defendant on 11/29/98,
more than 30 days after acceptance of Defendant's surrender of the
premises. (Trial Transcript page 193)
Did not deny conspiring with Plaintiff to rent the premises with known
safety defects, in direct violation of the UFPA and local ordinances.
(Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 19)
6

1

j.

2
3

Did not deny conspiring with Plaintiff to use rental income to fix known
safety defects. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 19)

k.

Did not deny knowledge of the Ogden residential rental license

4

requirement in May 1995, prior to entering into the lease agreement with

5

Defendant. (Trial Transcript page 31)

6

1.

7

8
9

10

Did not deny that the premises contained numerous safety defects and
building code violations. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 16)

m.

Did not deny the numerous violations of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Defendant's Brief in Chief, page 20)

In light of the 30 day extension granted to Third-Party Defendant for preparation of his

11

Appellee brief, and that the resultant brief consisted of only ten pages (when allowed 50), one

12

can easily conclude by the above lack of denial or counter argument that Third-Party Defendant

13

agreed with the facts cited and arguments posed in Defendant's Brief in Chief.

14

Summary of Defendant/Appellant's Argument

15

Third-Party Defendant provided Defendant the keys to the premises on June 30, 1995,

16

with the verified understanding that Plaintiffs personal property would be removed within two

17

weeks, maximum. Since Plaintiffs personal property was scattered throughout the premises,

18

prohibiting Defendant's access to or use of the premises, possession of the entire premises was

19

never provided to Defendant.

20

Refund of Defendant's security deposit was not contingent on completion of the lease

21

term. It was contingent only on the extent of damages to Plaintiff, according to Third-Party

22

Defendant's handwritten entries on lease agreement which stated "If no loss of income or

1
2

damages to owner deposit would be refundable." (Exhibit 76-D)
Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant's responsibilities with respect to the UFPA were not

3

contingent on any notice by Defendant. Their responsibilities resulted solely from their renting

4

a residence in Utah.

5
6
1
8
9
10

Issue #1 - Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant breached the lease
agreement without justifiable cause?
Defendant did not breach the contract. Defendant surrendered the premises to ThirdParty Defendant, Plaintiffs agent, who, according to the Third-Party Defendant's testimony at
trial, accepted the surrender and terminated the lease on behalf of Plaintiff, as follows:

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

[Wheeler to Judge] I was informed that it was okay to terminate this
lease based on the problems that she had had on this. She was at her wits end.
Her children were in a wreck, she couldn't get down here to get this furniture out
of this property and we had all these pressures on her. And so when I talked with
her I don't know if she knew what I had asked her or not. I don't know to this,
right now I don't know. But in her conversation with me she just, it was like she
threw her hands in the air and she said I've had it, that's fine, that's it. And so
that's what we acted upon with our conversation with Mr. Fink, [emphasis
added]

22

Plaintiffs agent), and termination of the lease agreement on Plaintiffs behalf, obligated

23

Plaintiff to that condition, and thereby terminated any responsibility for Defendant to perform

24

further.

25

Surrender of the premises by Defendant and acceptance by Third-Party Defendant (as

All of the witnesses who testified to the condition of the premises were self-serving,

26

except the Third-Party Defendant's maintenance man, Mr. Goddard. And he thought the

27

property was grossly in need of repair as follows:

28
29
30

Q.
A.

[Fink] Okay. What did you find when you first came out? What was
your initial assessment of the property?
[Goddard - Witness] It needed a lot of work.
8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Okay.
Had I walked through that place to rent it myself I wouldn't have rented it.
Okay. Do you recall making any knee jerk, gut feel reaction comment to
what you thought the extent of the repairs were that were necessary?
There was some repairs I wouldn't touch because I'm not qualified like the
electrical—
Okay.
— because it was a major electrical. If it's a switch or a plug or this I can
take care of. But when you've got wires hanging down ~ And I told Mr.
Wheeler that he should get a qualified electrician which I believe he did.
Okay. Do you recall making the statement that the owner needs to spend
about six months rent or about $ 10,000 to fix this place?
Yes. I probably said that.

Mr. Glover, who had never visited the premises or reviewed construction drawings, had a

15

professional self-serving interest in the declared condition of the property for he was the

16

supervisor of the office which issued a residential rental license to Third-Party Defendant for

17

the subject premises (as though it was code and safety compliant), after receipt of Defendant's

18

10/18/95 complaint letter, Exhibit 81-D), Interesting, the most positive declaration he could

19

muster about the property was when he stated "My first impression is probably tenantable but

20

it needs some maintenance."

21

Mr. Froerer was the replacement property manager for Plaintiff, after termination of

22

Third-Party Defendant. Mr. Froerer, who also had a professional interest in the stated

23

condition of the premises because he listed the premises on the rental market (as though it were

24

code and safety compliant), stated that the premises required repairs to be habitable as follows:

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

[Fink] Back to the question Counsel asked on whether or not you thought
the house was habitable.
[Froerer] Uh-huh (affirmative).
With or without repair?
No. We wanted repairs done.

Mr. Wheeler, had a obvious self-serving interest in declaring the premises habitable,
since he was the agent who leased the premises (as though it was code and safety complaint),
9

1

although he testified to having conspired with Plaintiff to rent the premises with known safety

2

defects and use the rental income to fix the defects, while the renters endured the unsafe

3

conditions as follows:

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

Q.

A.

[Fink] What did you do to make the property habitable, presentable, fix
things that were wrong with it during that time?
[Wheeler - Witness] We didn't do much because of lack of income.
Okay? We didn't do a lot to it. We maintained the outside of the yard.
Didn't do anything electrical inside or anything that way.
So that wasPam didn't have a lot of funds to put into this property to get this thing put
back together and wanted to use some of the rental money to fix it up.
So then it was, correct me if I'm wrong, is that to surmise that it was
acceptable to have a tenant move in in those conditions and fix it with
their money in effect?
[Wells] That begs the question, Your Honor.
[Judge] Well that's, that's appropriate. You can answer if you—
[Wheeler - Witness] Could you state that question again please, Pat?
[Fink] Was the intent to have a tenant move in and fix the property with
their money, the rental income? They were going to live in the conditions
that you felt weren't right but you were going to use their money to fix it?
[Wheeler] For a short period of time.

Plaintiffs self-serving interests in the declared condition of the premise are obvious.
Issue #4 - Did the trial court have proper grounds for dismissal of Third-Party Complaint?
Third-Party Defendant's argument on this point is completely misleading and without

26

basis in either fact or law. While Third-Party Defendant provides no argument for the

27

correctness of the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's Third-Party claims, he simply

28

presumes the decision to be correct, without justification. He then attempts to mislead the

29

Court by focusing on the unsupported argument that he should be awarded attorney's fees. The

30

salient issue here is that the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's Third-Party claims was

31

unjustified and unsupported by any findings of fact or evidence in the record. And there is no

10

1
2

argument by Third-Party Defendant to the contrary.
And Third-Party Defendant's argument about the security deposit being non-refundable

3

conspicuously omits a critical piece of evidence from Exhibit 76-D; that being the remainder of

4

the handwritten entry at the bottom of the lease agreement which states "If no loss of income or

5

damages to owner deposit would be refundable." At the time Third-Party Defendant was

6

relieved as Plaintiffs agent, there was no indication to Defendant that Plaintiff had incurred

7

any damages, since the premises were in better condition at termination than at the start of the

8

lease (Exhibits 58-D through 63-D), and the deposit at that time was therefore fully-refundable

9

to Defendant. Third-Party Defendant simply ignored the statute that requires full itemization

10

of the deductions and/or refund within 30 calendar days of termination. And to compound the

11

errors of Third-Party Defendant on this issue, the lease agreement required that the refund be

12

provided within 14 days of termination (Exhibit 76-D).

13

Issue #5 - Did the trial court properly act in dismissing Defendant's requestfor sanctions?

14

Third-Party Defendant correctly identified that Defendant cited to the record for all

15

instances of violation of Rule 11, URCP, as the factual basis for each violation. These citations

16

are reiterated from Defendant's closing arguments for the convenience of the Court as follows:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, and their respective attorneys
exacerbated the many problems of discovery in this case by obfuscating
the relevant facts and intentionally submitting information that was known
to be inaccurate and incomplete, forcing Defendant to resort to motions to
compel discovery and access upon land for inspection. The following is a
brief listing of claims and facts which were submitted by Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendant during the proceedings of this case, which were
known to be false, or which should have been known to be false at the
time they were submitted:

26

27
28

a.

In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 3, denial of #5), Plaintiff denied the following claim by

11

Defendant "That Plaintiff was aware or should have been aware that said
premise did not meet full compliance with the Uniform Code for Building
Conservation." This denial was made in spite of correspondence from
Defendant to Wheeler on 7/29/95 (Exhibit 79-D) which specifically stated
that the property did not conform to UCBC. Plaintiff testified in trial that
she received a tremendous amount of correspondence from Wheeler.
Plaintiff further testified in deposition (Exhibit 65-D, page 5 that she was
the general contractor for the remodeling (building) effort which resulting
in the log style house that exists today, that she lived in the house for
about 10 years (Exhibit 65-D, page 4), and that she was familiar with local
building codes (Exhibit 65-D, page 5) and therefore should have been
aware of the condition of the house with regard to prevailing building
codes, and that her responses to other counterclaims (such as #2, #3, #6,
#7, and #9) should not have been denied as well.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 3, denial of #10), Plaintiff denied the following
counterclaim by Defendant "That Plaintiff, by failing to provide premises
that were in full compliance with the Uniform Code for Building
Conservation and the Utah Fit Premises Act, created a situation in which
Defendant either had to live in substandard and unsafe conditions or
through the expenditure of his personal funds and efforts attempt to rectify
code violations." Plaintiff later claimed in response to request for
admissions numbers 3 and 22, dated April 24, 1996 (Exhibit 64-D), that
"Defendant warranted tht [sic] the condition of the premises were in good
repair and expressly agreed to repair and maintain the premises." These
two positions are in direct contradiction of one another.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 2, denial of #17), Plaintiff denied the following
counterclaim by Defendant "That Plaintiff having personal knowledge,
and knowledge by and through her agent, that her personal property and
household effects were encumbering and limiting Defendant's use of the
premises, and of Defendant's objection thereto, failed to remove all of said
property." Exhibit 75-D, pages 20-24, a copy of which Plaintiff testified to
receiving, along with Exhibits 79-D,80-D,81-D, and 82-D all address
objection to Plaintiffs personal property. Additionally, rent was withheld
as an incentive to Plaintiff to remove the personal property.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 3, denial of #19), Plaintiff denied the following
counterclaim by Defendant "That Plaintiff by and through her agent, was
notified to cure Uniform Building Code and Utah Fit Premises Act
violations." Exhibit 78-D contains specific identification of electrical
system problems which constitute a violation of the Utah Fit Premises Act,
12

Utah Code Ann., Section 57 22-4(l)(c), and Exhibit 75-D, pages 20-24
identify specific defects which are in violation of the Uniform Building
Code. These documents were provided to Plaintiffs agent on July 7, 1995
and to Plaintiff on July 18, 1995.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 6, page 3, lines 6-7), Plaintiff asserts that Defendant took
the premises "as-is." However, testimony from Third-Party Defendant
articulated oral agreements between Defendant and Plaintiffs agent to
repair defects and remove Plaintiff personal property. Additionally,
Plaintiff testified in deposition (Exhibit 65-D, pages 17-18) that she
removed some of her personal property "Because I had told you that I
would make an attempt to get my things out of there, which I did."
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 3, page 3, lines 7-12), Plaintiff asserts that by "the parties
agreed that certain items of Plaintiffs personality [sic] would be stored in
the basement of the premises." During trial, her attorney stipulated that
Plaintiff was never present during oral agreements. Also, the Tyler house
does not have a basement.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 6, page 3, lines 16- 18), Plaintiff claimed that "all
personality [sic] of hers which remained in the premises remained there
pursuant to a mutual agreement between the parties." Testimony provided
by Third-Party Defendant articulated the oral agreement and contradicted
her claim by stating that Plaintiffs personal property would be removed
within two weeks of signing the lease. Further, Exhibit 75-D, pages 20-24,
and Exhibits 79-D, 80-D, 81-D, and 82 D clearly indicate the agreement
Plaintiff asserts was not mutual.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 8, page 4, line 4), Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
"abandoned the premises." However, testimony by Mr. Wheeler indicated
that he obtained her concurrence with the termination when notified in late
September, 1995, and accepted surrender of the premises on her behalf on
October 20, 1995. Plaintiffs concurrence and acceptance of surrender are
in direct conflict with the assertion of abandonment, and is indicative of
the bad faith with which this Plaintiff proceeded to file suit knowing of her
own breach and concurrence in the property manager's termination of the
lease.
In a February 23, 1996 response to Defendant's counterclaim (Exhibit
66-D, paragraph 5, line 2-3, and paragraph 11, lines 3-4), Plaintiff claimed
in reference to the defects identified by Defendant, that "certain rivial [sic]
13

aspects of the premises did not meet with his approval" and "These iterms
[sic] were of a minor and trivial nature." Plaintiff later testified that there
were some major defects identified on the listing attached to the July 7,
1995 letter to Third Party Defendant (Exhibit 75-D, page 20), which was
also personally handed to Plaintiff on July 18, 1995. Also, testimony by
Mr. Goddard indicated that it would take about $10,000 or six months rent
to fix the problems, and that he had detailed those problems to Mr.
Wheeler in April and May of 1995.
In an April 24, 1996 response to Defendant's request for admissions
(Exhibit 64-D, Request No. 3), Plaintiff denied that there was no physical
damage to the premises caused by Defendant. Third-Party Defendant
admitted on March 29, 1996, in response to Defendant's request for
admissions, that the premises were in better condition at termination than
at the beginning of tenancy.
In an April 24, 1996 response to Defendant's request for admissions
regarding Plaintiff personal property (Exhibit 64-D, Request Nos. 4, 5,
8-16, & 19-20), Plaintiff asserted that Defendant "accepted the subject
property in the conditions [sic] it was in due to his desire to have
immediate occupancy of the premises)." Plaintiff later testified in
deposition (Exhibit 65-D, pages 17-18 ) to removing some of the property
because "I had told you I would make an attempt to get my things out of
there." Further, documentation abounds in Exhibits 79-D,80-D, 81-D,
82-D,and 75-D, pages 20-24 concerning the interference of personal
property, including rent withholding as an incentive to motivate Plaintiff.
In an April 24, 1996 response to Defendant's request for admissions
(Exhibit 64-D, Request Nos. 3 and 22), Plaintiff claimed that "Defendant
expressly warranted tht [sic] the premises were in good repair and
expressly agreed to repair and maintain the premises." However, testimony
provided by Third-Party Defendant revealed an agreement between
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant to use rental income to pay for repair
of known defects in the premises. Additionally, the property management
agreement with Third-Party Defendant (Exhibit 75-D, page 19) included
provisions to "supervise and discharge all labor required for the operation
and maintenance of the property."
In a May 15, 1996 response to Defendant's request for interrogatories and
production of documents (Exhibit 74-D), Plaintiff claimed that the Tyler
house "Passed UBC inspections when it was built." However, testimony
by Mr. Glover revealed that the current records from the Ogden City
repository (Exhibits 69-D, 70-D and 72-D) indicate that the required
building permits were never issued and the required inspections were
never performed on the Tyler house. These records were finally checked
14

by Plaintiffs attorney the day preceding the trial, and then only because he
had been notified that Mr. Glover would be a witness for defense. Plaintiff
testified in deposition (Exhibit 65-D, pages 4 and 5) that she was the
general contractor for the building, and that "I helped design the house, I
helped build it, I was involved with all of it." Thereby indicating that she
should have been cognizant of the requirements for inspection.
In a May 15, 1996 response to Defendant's request for interrogatories and
production of documents (Exhibit 74-D, page 9, Request No. 4 ), Plaintiff
claimed that there was no correspondence, notes, documents, or
memorandums related to the Tyler property, and that she therefore could
not provide anything in response to the Defendant's request for
documentation. However, in testimony, she admitted to receiving so much
correspondence from Third-Party Defendant that she didn't know what to
do with it.
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, page 9), Plaintiff
testified that when she terminated Third-Party Defendant as agent on or
about November 14, 1995 (Exhibit 75-D, page 10, shows last action date),
she "was questioning whether I wanted to continue to lease the house or
rent it to anybody." Records provided by Plaintiff (Exhibit 73-D, page 5)
indicate that Plaintiff commissioned Froerer Real Estate as property
manager only two days later on November 16, 1995, thereby suggesting
the her answer as to the reason for termination was questionable at best.
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, page 13), Plaintiffs
attorney stated "from July 1 through approximately October 20, 1995,
there is no argument regarding what you paid, what you deducted, and that
there were no late fees for that period." -Plaintiffs lawsuit claim states that
I refused to pay late fees for September and October, 1995. Nevertheless,
Plaintiff did not amend her complaint to drop that claim or stipulate that
Defendant did not need to further expend time and money to defend
against this claim.
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, pages 21-22), in an
obvious attempt to deny the serious defects in the electrical system that
existed during Defendant's tenancy, Plaintiff testified that no repair was
performed by Froerer on the electrical system. Records provided by Mr.
Froerer (Exhibit 86-D) and testimony by Mr. Froerer indicate that
significant electrical system repairs were completed in November and
December 1995, and that itemized statements were provided to Plaintiff
pursuant to his property management contract.
In her deposition on August 31, 1996 (Exhibit 65-D, page 28), Plaintiff
testified that Mr. John Saunders of Ogden City performed all required
15
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UBC inspections, yet the city records and testimony provided by Mr.
Glover indicate that the required plans were not submitted, the permits
were not issued, and the inspections were not performed (Exhibits 69-D,
70-D, and 72-D).
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s.

In his 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 response to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit
83-D, page 2, paragraph 3), Third-Party Defendant claimed that he "had no
responsibility to Third-Party Plaintiff at the time of the termination" of the
lease. His attorney later stated that the attorney wrote that section, in error.
This was clearly a known false statement and a clumsy effort to avoid
liability for the misappropriation of Defendant's security deposit.

t.

In his 2/9196 and 2/21/96 responses to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit
83-D, page 1, paragraph 1, reference to paragraph 5), Third-Party
Defendant claimed that he didn't have enough information to form an
opinion of whether or not he was aware of the Ogden city requirement for
licensing residential rental properties. According to testimony provided by
Mr. Glover, Third-Party Defendant was notified of the requirement in
writing by Ogden City on May 25, 1995 (Exhibits 92-D and 94-D).

u.

In his 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 responses to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit
83-D, page 1, reference to paragraph 9), Third-Party Defendant claimed
that he didn't have enough information to form an opinion of whether or
not he was notified to cure by Defendant of UCBC and Utah Fit Premises
Act violations in the property and failed to do so. Records he provided in
discovery included the July 29, 1995 letter (Exhibit 75-D, pages 25/26 and
Exhibit 79-D) from Defendant to Third-Party Defendant stating
non-compliance with the UCBC.

v.

In his 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 response
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied
code compliant. He later testified that
needed work had planned to use rental

w.

In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he failed to have Plaintiffs
personal property removed according to the oral agreement, but later
testified to the oral agreement to remove the property within two weeks of
signing the lease agreement.

x.

In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he failed to complete required
repairs according to the oral agreement, but later testified to the oral
agreement to repair the electrical system defects within two weeks of
signing the lease agreement, and maintenance records provided by
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to Defendant's complaint (Exhibit
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Third-Party Defendant indicate that no electrical system repairs were
completed.
In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that Defendant notified him of the
reasons for rent withholding, yet, in discovery, provided copies of
Defendant letters (Exhibit 75-D) dated July 29 (Exhibit 79-D), August 31
(Exhibit 80-D), and September 30, 1995 (Exhibit 81-D), all of which
itemize the withholdings.
In his response to Defendant's complaint on 2/9/96 and 2/21/96 (Exhibit
83-D), Third-Party Defendant denied that he failed to comply with the
provisions of Utah Ann., Section 57-17 regarding refund of deposits. This
claim was made in spite of his letter dated November 15, 1995 (Exhibit
84-D), which does not contain required information and which was mailed
on November 29, 1995, and his own property management records
(Exhibit 75-D, page 10), which indicate that the deposit was spent on
routine repairs, advertisements, bank charges, and a license application,
rather that being forwarded to Plaintiff as claimed.
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996,
Third-Party Defendant denied that Defendant did not accept the property
"as-is", yet testified to oral agreements to remove Plaintiffs personal
property and complete the electrical system and repairs within two weeks
of signing the lease agreement.
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996,
Third-Party Defendant claimed that Defendant's security deposit of
$800.00 was forward to Plaintiff, however his own property management
records (Exhibit 75-D, page 10) indicate that the deposit was spent, except
for $59.35, which was forwarded to the Plaintiff on November 14, 1995.
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996,
Third-Party Defendant claimed to have had the garage door keyless entry
system repaired, however his own property management records clearly
indicate that there was never a repair completed on the entry system, and it
was in fact never repaired. The combo had been changed, but that was
before Defendant notified Third-Party Defendant on 7/29/95 (Exhibit
79-D) that the system was inoperative.
In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996,
Third Party Defendant claimed that the Plaintiffs personal property was
stored on the premises with permission of Defendant, but failed when
repeatedly requested in discovery to produce any documentation of that
permission, and later testified to the oral agreement to remove the property
17
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within two weeks of signing the lease agreement.
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In his response to Defendant's request for admissions on March 29, 1996,
Third-Party Defendant claimed that only four light fixtures were defective,
yet testified to previous agreement with Plaintiff that the needed repairs
were so extensive as to need to use rental income to pay for them.

ff.

In his responses to Defendant's requests for interrogatories and production
of documents on April 30, 1996 (Exhibit 75-D), Third-Party Defendant
failed to provide the residence address for Mr. Goddard until the hearing
on August 31, 1996, and even then, Third-Party Defendant provided the
address from memory while his attorney was expounding to the Court why
that information couldn't be provided.
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gg.

In his responses to Defendant's requests for interrogatories and production
of documents on April 30, 1996 (Exhibit 75-D), Third-Party Defendant
indicated that maintenance personnel Mike Goddard, Mike Bachman, and
Ron of Rocky Mountain Door would be witnesses (with no other
requested witness information provided) until a late supplemental response
to Defendant's motion to compel changed that response to indicate they
were never to be witnesses.

hh.

In his responses to Defendant's requests for interrogatories and production
of documents on April 30, 1996 (Exhibit 75-D), Third-Party Defendant
claimed that he responded to Defendant's July 7, 1995 listing of defects to
the extent that Defendant provided access to the premises, yet his own
property management records indicate no repairs until September, 1995,
and Mr. Goddard testified to establishing a weekly time for access to the
property for repairs and maintenance at the first meeting when dispatched
by Third-Party Defendant in early July 1995.

32

And Third-Party Defendant's assertion regarding Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules of
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Appellate Procedure attempts to mislead the Court, for Defendant established the basis for

34

appeal according to Rule 24(a)(5)(B) in his Brief in Chief, on page three, as follows:

35
36
37
38
39
40

Statement of Grounds for seeking review of issues not preserved in trial
court
As a Pro Se litigant, experiencing his first visit to a trial court, Defendant
was not aware of the requirement to tell the court how to handle pre-trial motions
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or court proceedings initiated by the judge. Additionally, all of the other issues in
this appeal involve actions that occurred after completion of the trial proceedings.
"It is, of course, true that a party need not request amendment to the
findings of fact at the trial level in order to pursue an appeal thereon. "
Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979)

Issue #9 - Was the trial court correct in finding that Defendant was required to provide a
second Utah Fit Premises Act notice in an action for breach of contract and constructive
eviction?
The UFPA applies only to the habitability concerns of the premises, not the constructive

12

eviction issues regarding failure to deliver and obstruction of use and enjoyment of the

13

premises. Therefore, Defendant was not required to provide formal notice of intent to take

14

legal action for the failure of Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant to remove Plaintiffs personal

15

property from the premises. Nor was Defendant required to provide formal notice that the

16

property was not habitable, since the uninhabitable conditions existed from the beginning of

17

the lease term, and were known by both Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant prior to placing

18

the property on the rental market.

19

The UFPA applies to all residential rentals, providing guidance on the minimum

20

standards with which all landlords must comply. The provisions of the UFPA address what

21

landlords must do, what tenants must do, and what can be done if either fails to comply.

22

In the event that the condition of a property falls below minimum habitable standards,

23

there are provisions within the UFPA for formal notice of defects and legal action by the

24

tenant. The notices of defect must also allow adequate time for the landlord to respond by

25

curing the defects. These provisions are appropriate only if the property falls below acceptable

26

standards, since landlords can rent only UFPA compliant premises. The language of the

19

1

UFPA indicates a presumption that the conditions of the premises are always habitable at the

2

start of the lease term. However, when the conditions are unacceptable at the beginning of the

3

lease term, the landlord is non-compliant with the provisions of the UFPA, and the notice

4

requirements imposed on the tenant are not applicable.

5

Under no reasonable interpretation of the law is a tenant required to endure uninhabitable

6

conditions as a matter of law. When a landlord fails to provide habitable conditions, the

7

implied warranty of habitability is breached, and consequently, the lease agreement as a

8

binding contract is breached, leaving the tenant with two choices: terminate and vacate, or

9

remain in the premises and invoke the legal action provisions of the UFPA. If the tenant at that

10

juncture elects to vacate the premises and terminate the contract, the tenant is considered to be

11

constructively evicted by virtue of the uninhabitable conditions and the formal notice and legal

12

action provisions of the UFPA do not apply. If the tenant elects to remain in the premises, the

13

formal notice and legal action provisions of the UFPA can be used by the tenant to secure

14

needed repairs. The UFPA provides a vehicle and leverage for correction of the uninhabitable

15

conditions while remaining in the premises. And it is when the tenant chooses to remain in the

16

premises, and only then, that the UFPA requirements for formal deficiency notification to the

17

landlord become effective. The UFPA, with its inherent notification requirements, is simply

18

one of the means that a tenant may employ to retain habitable conditions.
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CONCLUSION

1

2
3

It is plainly evident from the preceding that the Third-Party Defendant has no factual

4

basis for denial that the trial court erred throughout the course of this case. The conspicuous

5

absence of denial or argument against the arguments posed in Defendant's Brief in Chief serve

6

as compelling evidence of Third-Party Defendant's agreement with Defendant's Brief in Chief.

7

As stated in Defendant's Brief in Chief, it is only through reversal of all aspects of the

8

judgement, or a complete and impartial review of the facts in this matter by the appellate court,

9

that justice can be achieved in this matter. Therefore, Defendant requests reversal on all

10

rulings of the trial court or a de novo review by the appellate court of the evidence of record in

11

this case, with damages, expenses, and appeal costs (to be provided via later affidavit) awarded

12

to Defendant.
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DATED this Affday of September, 1998.
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